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基本信息

ARP5150
Safety Assessment of Transport Airplanes in Commercial Service
Safety Assessment of Transport Airplanes in Commercial Service
2003-11-01
有效
【范围】 This document describes guidelines, methods and tools used to perform the ongoing safety assessment process for transport airplanes in commercial service (hereafter, airplane). The process described herein is intended to support an overall safety management program. It is associated with showing compliance with the regulations, and also with assuring a company that it meets its own internal standards. The methods outlined herein identify a systematic means, but not the only means, to assess ongoing safety. This document does not address the economic decision-making associated with the safety management process. While this decision-making is an integral part of the safety management process, this document addresses only the ongoing safety assessment process. To put it succinctly, this document addresses the “Is it safe?” part of safety management. It does not address the “How much does it cost?” part of the safety management. This document also does not address any specific organizational structures for accomplishing the safety assessment process. While the nature of the organizational structure is significant to the quality of a safety program, this document focuses on the functions to be accomplished and does not attempt to define what the structure should be. The intent is to leave the greatest amount of flexibility to the organizations that use this document. 1.1 Purpose: This document provides a systematic process to measure and monitor safety to help determine safety priorities and focus available resources in areas that offer the greatest potential to improve aviation safety. The current practice for ongoing safety assessment relies primarily on input from individual carriers or operators, with substantial involvement from the manufacturers, suppliers, airworthiness authorities, and other aviation service providers. There are variations in practices at all levels throughout the industry. Also, air transport carriers, air cargo carriers, and manufacturers each use their own methods for accomplishing safety assessment. It is felt that the creation of an industry practice will enhance consistency of approach in how airplane safety assessment is conducted and how airplanes are operated worldwide. This document is not a regulation. It is, rather, a compendium of best safety practices gathered together as a reference. It allows the users to compare their existing methods to those listed herein to seek improvements. To improve safety during the complete airplane life cycle, it is not sufficient to assess the safety of the airplane only during its design phase. Ongoing airplane operations must be evaluated for safety (e.g., maintenance or operation procedures). The airplane is also evolving and changing during the “In-Service” phase (e.g., obsolescence, modifications). Differences exist or can develop between the assumptions made during the design phase and how the airplanes are actually operated and maintained. For these reasons, safety should be assessed also during the “In-Service” phase of the airplane life cycle. In order to do that, information must be collected, monitored and analyzed. A large portion of this needed information may already exist in an organization's maintenance or warranty information databases. In addition to maintaining the safety of the airplane, there is also a need to enhance safety wherever possible. This means that the user must always be alert to the opportunity to advance safety where possible and feasible. The transport airplane accident rate has remained stable since approximately 1975, while the number of aircraft has greatly increased. The number of airplanes in commercial service is expected to increase. The transport aviation industry provides the safest form of transportation in the world, but each accident generates tremendous negative effect. Therefore, the accident rate must be reduced in order to keep the number of accidents low. Thus, it is imperative to constantly improve. This can be accomplished by continuously changing what we do and what we accept as adequate. 1.2 How to Use This Document: The intent of this document is to identify typical activities, methods, and documentation that may be used in the performance of safety assessments for airplanes (including their associated systems and equipment) and user operations. The document describes a number of valid methods for resolution of safety issues, selection of actions and their scheduling. The specific applicability and usefulness of the individual guidelines, methods and tools will vary among organizations and from situation to situation. The user is not constrained to use all of the elements contained within this document. Each organization needs to establish which sections may prove helpful in improving or supplementing their existing safety related practices. The guidelines, methods and tools provided in this document are to be used in conjunction with other applicable guidance materials. The appendices are not standalone documents and are to be used in conjunction with the information contained in the basic document. The user is cautioned not to use the appendices independent of the basic document. Document users are also cautioned not to engage in the practice of ascribing greater importance or validity to one method or tool presented in the appendices herein, over another when addressing safety issues. No hierarchy is intended, either explicitly or implicitly by the authors. 1.3 Intended Users: The intended users of this document include but are not limited to: a. operators b. manufacturers c. equipment suppliers d. modification or repair centers e. airworthiness authorities Anyone who is involved with the safety assessment and safety management of transport airplanes in commercial service may be a potential user.strRefField
【与前一版的变化】

包含缩略语

AC
ACJ
ACO
AD
AEG
AIA
AMJ
AMOC
APMS
ARP
ASAP
ASRS
ATA
BASIS
CA
CAAM
CDL
CFIT
CFR
CMR
CRM
ETOPS
FAA
FCOM
FMEA
FTA
FOQA
HF
ICAO
JAA
JAR
LRU
MEL
MIDO
MMEL
MOC
MPD
MRB
MSG-3
MTBF
NASDAC
NTSB
OEM
SAE
SB
SDR
WATOG

引用文件/被引文件

Flight Operational Quality Assurance
Special Conditions
JAR 21.3
Airworthiness Standards: Transport Category Aircraft
Large Aeroplanes
Engine Torque
Engines
System Design and Analysis
System Design and Analysis
Engine mounting attachments and structure
Safety Analysis
Blade containment and rotor unbalance tests.
Airworthiness Directives
General Operating and Flight Rules
Mechanical Reliability Reports
Service Difficulty Reports (Structural)
Mechanical Interruptions Summary Report
Protection of Voluntarily Submitted Information
Rules pertaining to the Notification and Reporting of Aircraft Accidents or Incidents and Overdue Aircraft
Continuing Airworthiness of Aircraft
Accident Investigation
Certification Considerations for Highly-Integrated or Complex Aircraft Systems
Guidelines and Methods for Conducting the Safety Assessment Process on Civil Airborne Systems and Equipment
Specification for Manufacturer’s Technical Data
Airworthiness Concern Coordination Process
Airline/Manufacturer Maintenance Program Development Document MSG-3
Supplemental Report on Turbine Engine Rotor Uncontained Events
Standard Practice for System Safety
(R) Guidelines for Development of Civil Aircraft and Systems

包含图表

Overview of the Ongo
Ongoing Safety Asses
Integrated Ongoing S
table 1
Data Base Access
FIGURE 1
FIGURE 2
Aircraft Manufacture
Aircraft Manufacture
Aircraft Manufacture
Aircraft Manufacture
Aircraft Manufacture
Aircraft Manufacture
Aircraft Manufacture
Aircraft Manufacture
Aircraft Manufacture
table 3
table 3 continue
table 3 continue
table 3 continue
table 4
table 4 continue
table 5
table 6
table 7
Airline Classificati
Airline Classificati
Airline Classificati
Airline Classificati
Airline Classificati
Airline Classificati
Significant Failure
Significant Failure
Significant Failure
Significant Failure
Significant Failure
Significant Failure
BASIS Risk Assessmen
BASIS Risk Factor Ma
Hazard Severity Cate
AC 25-1309 Failure C
AMJ 25.1309 Failure
CAAM Hazard Levels
Engine Manufacturer
Operator Classificat
MIL-STD-882D Hazard
AC 25.1309 Probabili
AMJ 25.1309 Probabil
Engine Manufacturer
Operator Probability
Hazard Risk Matrix E
Rare Event Approxima
formula 1
formula 2
formula 3
formula 4
Confidence Factors t
formula 5
formula 6
formula 7
formula 8
formula 9
formula 10
formula 11
formula 12
formula 13
Example Results for
formula 14
formula 15
formula 16
Cumulative Fleet Ris
Event Probability vs
More Accurate Cumula
formula 17
formula 18
formula 19
formula 20
Fleet Risk Analysis
Generic Event Tree
Root Cause Dispositi
Action Item List For
Root Cause Analysis
Two Examples of Cons
Example Event Tree
Goodman Diagram Used
Assigning Priorities
Example of Similar R
Example Rotor Blade
Example Status Repor
Goodman Diagram Show
Closure of Events
Sample Weibull Plot
formula 21
formula 22
formula 23
BETA (slope) vs Agin
formula 24
formula 25
Example Engine Failu
Baseline to Correcte

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