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ARP4761
GUIDELINES AND METHODS FOR CONDUCTING THE SAFETY ASSESSMENT PROCESS ON CIVIL AIRBORNE SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT
GUIDELINES AND METHODS FOR CONDUCTING THE SAFETY ASSESSMENT PROCESS ON CIVIL AIRBORNE SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT
1996-12-01
有效
【范围】 This document describes guidelines and methods of performing the safety assessment for certification of civil aircraft. It is primarily associated with showing compliance with FAR/JAR 25.1309. The methods outlined here identify a systematic means, but not the only means, to show compliance. A subset of this material may be applicable to non-25.1309 equipment. The concept of Aircraft Level Safety Assessment is introduced and the tools to accomplish this task are outlined. The overall aircraft operating environment is considered. When aircraft derivatives or system changes are certified, the processes described herein are usually applicable only to the new designs or to existing designs that are affected by the changes. In the case of the implementation of existing designs in a new derivation, alternate means such as service experience may be used to show compliance. 1.1 Purpose: This document presents guidelines for conducting an industry accepted safety assessment consisting of Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA), Preliminary System Safety Assessment (PSSA), and System Safety Assessment (SSA). This document also presents information on the safety analysis methods needed to conduct the safety assessment. These methods include the Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Dependence Diagram (DD), Markov Analysis (MA), Failure Modes and Effect Analysis (FMEA), Failure Modes and Effects Summary (FMES) and Common Cause Analysis (CCA). [CCA is composed of Zonal Safety Analysis (ZSA), Particular Risks Analysis (PRA), and Common Mode Analysis (CMA)]. 1.2 Intended Users: The intended users of this document include, but are not limited to, airframe manufacturers, system integrators, equipment suppliers and certification authorities who are involved with the safety assessment of civil aircraft and associated systems and equipment. 1.3 How To Use This Document: The guidelines and methods provided in this document are intended to be used in conjunction with other applicable guidance materials, including ARP4754, RTCA/DO-178, RTCA SC-180 Document DO-(TBD), and with the advisory material associated with FAR/JAR 25.1309. (For engines and propeller applications, reference the applicable FAR/JAR advisory material.) The intent of this document is to identify typical activities, methods, and documentation that may be used in the performance of safety assessments for civil aircraft and their associated systems and equipment. The specific application of such activities needs to be established by the organization conducting the assessment and the appropriate recipient. This document provides general guidance in evaluating the safety aspects of a design. The primary analytical methods and tools and the relationship of these are introduced. Users who need further information on a specific method or tool may obtain detailed information from appendices A through K. These appendices provide information on Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA), Preliminary System Safety Assessment (PSSA), System Safety Assessment (SSA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Dependence Diagram (DD), Markov Analysis (MA), Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Failure Modes and Effects Summary (FMES), Zonal Safety Analysis (ZSA), Particular Risks Analysis (PRA) and Common Modes Analysis (CMA). Appendix L provides an example of the safety assessment process for a hypothetical system. This contiguous example illustrates the relationships between the processes and methods in creating the overall safety evaluation of an aircraft or system as it develops through the design cycle. NOTE: The appendices are not stand alone documents, but are intended to be used in conjunction with the information contained in the basic document. The user is cautioned not to use the appendices independent of the basic document. Further, the examples in the Appendix L “Contiguous Example” should not be used without making reference to the corresponding appendix and to the main body of this document. Examples presented in this document, including documentation examples, are intended only as guidance. The examples should not be interpreted as an addition to or an amplification of any requirement. Throughout this document and the appendixes, reference is made to using Fault Tree Analyses. It should be understood by the reader that Dependence Diagrams or Markov Analyses may be selected to accomplish the same purpose, depending on the circumstances and the types of data desired. ARP1834 and ARP926A contain information about Fault/Failure Analysis but are superseded by this document for purposes of civil aircraft safety assessment. They are being amended to reflect this supersession.strRefField
【与前一版的变化】

包含缩略语

AC
A/C
ACJ
AMJ
ARP
CCA
CMA
CMR
DD
FAA
FAR
FC
FC&C
FE
FHA
FM
FMEA
FMES
FTA
H/W
HIRF
JAA
JAR
LRU
MA
MRB
MSG-3
PRA
PSSA
RTCA
SAE
SSA
S/W
ZSA
ACCU
ALT
APU
AS
B
BSCU
C
CMD
COMP
CSMG
ECS
ELEC
EMI
HIRF
HYD
IC
I/O
CAT IIIb
CPU
F.R.
G
L or LH
LRU
MLG
MON
MT
NLG
NORM
PCU
POS
P/S
PTU
PWM
PWR
R or RH
R
REF
RTO
STBY
SYS
VDC
V1
WBS

引用文件/被引文件

Certification Considerations for Highly-Integrated or Complex Aircraft Systems
Reliability Prediction of Electronic Equipment
Reliability Engineering Handbook
NASA Parts Application Handbook
Airworthiness Standards: Transport Category Airplanes
Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification
Design Assurance Guidance for Airborne Electronic Hardware (RTCA Special Committee -180)
Large Aeroplanes
System Design and Analysis
System Design and Analysis
Fault Tree Handbook
Nonelectronic Parts Reliability Data
Failure Mode/Mechanism Distribution
Government Industry Data Exchange Program
Reliability Engineers Toolkit
Airborne Chemicals in Aircraft Cabins
Actuators: Mechanical, Geared Rotary, General Specification For
(R) Aerospace - Design and Installation of Commercial Transport Aircraft Hydraulic Systems
(R) Guidelines for Development of Civil Aircraft and Systems
Safety Assessment of Transport Airplanes in Commercial Service
Transport Category Airplane Head Up Display (HUD) Systems
Aerospace-Interface Definition for Mechanical Actuation Subsystems
User’s Manual for Certification of Aircraft Electrical/Electronic Systems for the Indirect Effects of Lightning
(R) Guide to Certification of Aircraft in a High-Intensity Radiated Field (HIRF) Environment
Human Engineering Considerations for Airborne Implementation of Enhanced Synthetic Vision Systems
(R) Aircraft Fluorescent Lighting Ballast/Fixture Safety Standard
Minimum Design and Performance of Airplane Galley Insert Equipment, Electrical/Pressurized
Aerospace - Flight Control Systems - Design, Installation and Test of Piloted Military Aircraft, General Specification For
(R) Guidelines for Preparing Reliability Assessment Plans for Electronic Engine Controls
Minimum Operational Performance Specification for Inflight Icing Detection Systems
SAE Architecture Analysis and Design Language (AADL) Annex Volume 1: Annex A: Graphical AADL Notation, Annex C: AADL Meta-Model and Interchange Formats, Annex D: Language Compliance and Application Program Interface Annex E: Error Model Annex
Minimum Operational Performance Specification for Remote On-Ground Ice Detection Systems
(R) ARC Fault Circuit Breaker ( AFCB), Aircraft, Trip-Free Single Phase and Three Phase 115 VAC, 400 Hz - Constant Frequency
Air Quality for Commercial Aircraft Cabins

包含图表

Overview of the Safe
Failure Condition Se
Example of the Relat
Safety Assessment Di
Safety Objective Ver
TABLE A1
Aircraft Level Funct
System Level Functio
System Level PSSA Pr
System Level SSA Pro
Example of a Typical
Fault Tree Symbols
Examples of FTA Boun
Sources of Top Level
Examples of Undesire
Upper Tier of Fault
Upper Tier of Fault
Upper Tier of Fault
Expanding a Fault Tr
Example of a Fault T
Example of a Fault T
Example of a Fault T
Example of a Fault T
Summary of Qualitati
Tree to Demonstrate
Tree to Demonstrate
formula 1
Reduced Fault Tree
An Example of a Faul
An Example of a Faul
An Example of a Faul
formula 2
formula 3
formula 4
An Example of a Faul
Pictorial Representa
formula 5
An Example of a Faul
An Example of a Faul
formula 6
formula 7
formula 8
formula 9
An Example of a Faul
formula 10
FIGURE 21
formula 11
formula 12
formula 13
formula 14
formula 15
formula 16
formula 17
formula 18
formula 19
formula 20
formula 21
formula 22
Example Fault Tree,
Consideration of Com
FIGURE D23 (Continue
FIGURE D23 (Continue
FIGURE D23 (Continue
Example of a System
Example of an LRU In
Series/Parallel Comb
formula 23
Fully Developed Fail
Undeveloped Failure
Indirect Probability
Failure or Event Ext
Definitions of Terms
TABLE F1 (Continued)
An Example of Input/
formula 24
Markov Model of a Si
formula 25
formula 26
formula 27
formula 28
formula 29
Markov Model of a Si
formula 30
Markov Model of a Si
formula 31
formula 32
Markov Model of a Si
formula 33
A List of Generic Fa
Signal Flow Represen
Markov Chain Represe
formula 34
Markov Chain Represe
Effect of Using FEHM
Markov Chain Represe
Reduced State Space
Reduced State Space
Separate Sub-chains
Markov Chain for a C
Markov Chain for a C

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